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The Hilltop Review, Spring 2015 
The Problem of Nomological Impossibility for Epistemic 
Structural Realism 
 
By Patrick Manzanares 




In his article “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?”, John Worrall introduces 
the concept of ‘structure’ in order to defend a version of Scientific Realism that respects 
historical considerations of ontological discontinuity between successive scientific theories.  
Worrall argues that despite the fact that there is no ontological continuity between successive 
scientific theories in general, successor theories do preserve the formal structure of earlier 
theories.  The formal structure of an earlier theory is usually preserved as a “limiting case” of 
the successor theory’s structure: the earlier structure can be recovered from the successor 
structure by allowing some quantity in the latter to tend towards some limit (Worrall 1989, 
120).   
This retention of formal structure between successive theories, according to Worrall, 
underlies the cumulative nature of science.  This cumulative nature, in turn, provides reason to 
believe that the formal structures of current scientific theories are (approximately) accurate.  
If formal structure is in fact preserved between successive theories, then only the accuracy of 
the relevant formal structures can adequately explain the empirical success of science.   
Despite the potential loss of ontology between theories, then, the Scientific Realist is justified 
in believing in the approximate accuracy of the structures of current scientific theories. 
The fact that most cases of structure retention involve limiting cases, however, presents a 
problem for Worrall’s account.  It seems that some earlier theories can only be recovered 
from successor theories as nomologically impossible idealizations of the latter, since this 
recovery involves allowing some quantity in the formal structure of the successor theory to 
tend towards some physically unrealizable limit.  But if this is the case, then the earlier theory 
cannot be physically realized either.  It is thus unclear in what sense the structure of the earlier 
theory can be said to accurately represent the physical structure of the world, since the former 
is nomologically impossible while the latter is actual (ex hypothesi).  If the nomological 
impossibility of the earlier theory’s structure undermines the Scientific Realist’s justification 
for believing in it, moreover, then the preservation of structure through theory change will fail 
to secure justification for the belief in the accuracy of the successor theory’s formal structure.  
The Scientific Realist will thus be left with no reason to believe in the structural accuracy of 
current scientific theories. 
 
II. Epistemic Structural Realism 
Worrall introduces the position of Epistemic Structural Realism in order to accommodate 
Scientific Realist intuitions about the empirical success of science as a whole while 
addressing concerns about theory change.  Worrall notes that the main argument in favor of 
Scientific Realism is the so-called “No Miracles” Argument: the only adequate explanation of 
the empirical success of science is the claim that mature sciences are approximately true; we 
should therefore believe in the approximate truth of the mature
i
 sciences (Worrall 1989, 100). 
This argument for the Scientific Realist position, Worrall notes, relies on the claim that 
the succession of scientific theories has historically been “essentially cumulative” (Worrall 
1989, 105).  Some elements of the supplanted (yet mature) theory, in addition to its successful 
(observational) empirical consequences, must be preserved to some degree by the successor 
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(and also mature) theory in order for the two successive theories to exhibit a robust form of 
continuity between them.  It is in virtue of this type of continuity that the Scientific Realist 
can be justified in advancing the “No Miracles” Argument.  Once the continuity has been 
established, the Scientific Realist can infer by induction that any future succession of 
scientific theories will also be essentially cumulative.  All earlier mature theories will thus be 
viewed as approximately correct from the standpoint of later theories by virtue of this 
continuity.  This approximate correctness, in turn, will serve as the only adequate explanation 
of their empirical success and must therefore be accepted. 
The crucial claim that science is essentially cumulative faces a forceful historical 
objection, however.  This objection is expressed by the Pessimistic Meta-Induction Argument, 
which denies the robust continuity between scientific theories to which the Scientific Realist 
appeals.  According to this argument, the history of science includes many examples of 
mature and empirically successful theories that were once believed to be approximately true 
but are now considered thoroughly false from the perspective of current mature and successful 
theories.  This suggests science is not essentially cumulative, as there have been mature and 
successful theories once thought to be approximately correct that have not been preserved to 
any degree by contemporary theories.  But if successive scientific theories do not exhibit the 
requisite continuity, the Scientific Realist cannot appeal to the approximate truth of theories 
(both supplanted and successors) in order to explain the empirical success of science as a 
whole. 
Worrall believes the Scientific Realist should concede the fact that science is not 
essentially cumulative with respect to theoretical posits (Worrall 1989, 109).  Despite 
preserving the successful empirical consequences of its predecessor, a successor scientific 
theory rarely (if ever) retains the complete theoretical ontology of this predecessor.  
Nevertheless, Worrall claims there is robust continuity of formal structure between successive 
theories (Worrall 1989, 120).  The mathematical equations
ii
 describing the relations between 
the theoretical posits of a supplanted theory are preserved to a large extent by the 
corresponding successor theory.  This suggests that the Scientific Realist need not commit to 
the continuity of ontology between successive theories as the crucial factor underlying the 
cumulative nature of science.  The Scientific Realist can account for the empirical success of 
scientific theories by appealing to the retention of formal structure between successive 
theories, which indicates that the Scientific Realist can be justified in believing the accuracy 
of these formal structures in approximating the actual physical structure of the world.  This 
Realist epistemic attitude towards the formal structures of mature and empirically successful 
scientific theories constitutes the core of Worrall’s Epistemic Structural Realism. 
 
III. An Objection 
Christopher Pincock (2011) raises a worry for the Epistemic Structural Realist 
concerning the accuracy of an empirically successful theory’s structure.  The empirical 
success of a scientific theory, Pincock claims, does not guarantee that the structure of the 
theory is an exact representation of the structure characterizing the relevant physical 
phenomenon being studied.   
Pincock argues that the formal structure of an empirically successful scientific theory 
might fail to accurately represent the physical structure of the world (or of some relevant sub-
domain of the world) in one of two ways: the relevant theory might contain too much 
structure, or it might contain too little (Pincock 2011, 74).  In the first case, the mathematics 
of a theory might be more complex than what is in fact needed to describe the relations 
obtaining among the entities of a particular physical system.
iii
  The theory containing this 
overly complex mathematical structure could still be empirically successful, since it would 
contain the necessary resources to generate accurate predictions.  Nevertheless, the structure 
of such a theory would not be faithful to the physical structure of the world. 
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The structure of a theory can also fail to capture the entire structure of the physical 
system it studies.  It might be the case that the formal structure of such a theory does not take 
into account certain parameters whose effects, while being exemplified or instantiated in the 
physical system under consideration, are not noticeable enough at the scale under 
consideration to sufficiently affect the empirical adequacy of the theory at this scale.
iv
  The 
structure of the scientific theory would thus seem to accurately represent the structure of the 
physical system being studied, but only because certain ranges of initial and boundary 
conditions (corresponding to smaller and larger scales of the physical system) are not taken 
into account. 
If the formal structure of a theory fails to have the exact amount of structure, Pincock, 
argues, “there is no reason to think that the structures appealed to will survive theoretical 
change” (Pincock 2011, 75).  This would then rob the Epistemic Structural Realist of a key 
premise in the relevant formulation of the “No Miracles” Argument: the claim that science is 
essentially cumulative with respect to formal structure. 
 
IV. Limiting Cases 
Pincock notes, however, that an Epistemic Structural Realist can at this point appeal to 
the limiting relation that is supposed to obtain between mature successive scientific theories in 
order to rescue the notion of structural continuity between theories (Pincock 2011, 75-76).  
The Epistemic Structural Realist can grant the fact that structure is rarely carried over intact 
from an earlier theory to a successor theory.  Even when mature scientific theories do not 
contain the correct amount of structure (they contain too much or too little), successor theories 
can add needed structure or subtract excess structure without violating structural continuity 
between theories.  This can be accomplished by ensuring that the formal structure of an earlier 
theory is preserved as a limiting case of the successor theory’s structure (Worrall 1989, 120). 
In his (1981), Larry Laudan provides a straightforward description of the limiting case 
relation that the Epistemic Structural Realist claims obtains between successive theories.  If 
an earlier theory T1 is a limiting case of a successor theory T2, then (1) the variables 
representing both observational and theoretical terms that are assigned a value in T1 form a 
subset of the set of variables that are assigned a value of T2, and (2) the values that T2 assigns 
to the variables in this subset are sufficiently close to the values that T1 assigned to the 
variables in that subset, provided certain initial and boundary conditions are met (Laudan 
1981, 39). 
Laudan argues that this characterization of the limiting case relation commits the 
Scientific Realist to the perfect preservation of ontology (including theoretical posits) 
whenever T1 is succeeded by T2, if T1 is to count as a limiting case of T2 (Laudan 1981, 40).  
But notice that the Epistemic Structural Realist need not commit to such a strong claim.  
While granting the above description of what the limiting case relation between two 
successive theories is, it will be enough for T2 to preserve the relations between the variables 
assigned a value by T1 in order for T1 to count as a limiting relation of T2.  In preserving the 
relations between the variables of T1 described by the mathematical equations of this theory, 
T2 need not also preserve the ontology of T1.  By simply preserving the structural relations of 
T1, the theory T2 will also preserve the arity of these relations and can thus preserve the 
variables of T1.  In this way, the two theories can satisfy a weakened form of condition (1) 
above without the need for the retention of ontology:  the variables of T2 that stand in the 
same relations to each other as the relations in which the variables in T2 stand to each other 
need not refer to the same entities in T2 as they did in T1.  Condition (2) can similarly be 
satisfied without the need for a shared ontology between the theories T1 and T2: the preserved 
variables can be assigned similar values by T1 and T2 without having to refer to the same 
entities in both theories. 
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Once again, this retention of structure need not be complete.
v
  If the theory T1 contains 
too little structure to accurately represent the structure of the physical world, the theory T2 can 
“preserve” the variables of T1 while including more relations among these variables, as well 
as adding more relations between the variables of T1 and the new variables found only in T2.  
As such, T2 can supplement the deficient formal structure of T1.  If, on the other hand, T1 has 
more structure than T2, then a corresponding story can be told.  It is possible for T2 to 
eliminate redundant elements of T1’s formal structure, where these surplus structural elements 
might be identified by the discovery of their unnecessary role in generating successful 
predictions, lack of heuristic value, etc.  In this way, T2 can pare down the surplus structure of 
T1 while preserving the essential structural components of T1 (where what is “essential” will 
presumably be determined by criteria such as causal efficaciousness, for example).  
A result of the imperfect preservation of structure between successive scientific theories 
is the fact that the Epistemic Structural Realist must limit claims of justification to beliefs 
about the approximate accuracy of a scientific theory’s formal structure.  Because there is 
reason to believe that neither the earlier theory nor its predecessor will have the exact level of 
structural detail that perfectly matches the amount of physical structure exhibited by the 
world, the Epistemic Structural Realist must settle for a version of the “No Miracles” 
Argument that employs the assumption of partial structure preservation between successive 
theories.  The Epistemic Structural Realist can then argue for the comparatively modest 
conclusion that the formal structures of mature scientific theories are approximately accurate 
representations of the physical structure present in the world.  
 
V. Idealizations in Scientific Model Construction 
How exactly can the structure of an earlier theory be recovered as a limiting case of a 
successor theory?  Many instances of the limiting case relation between mature (according to 
Worrall’s criteria) successive scientific theories involve idealization assumptions.  In 
discussing the process of model construction in the context of the Semantic View of 
theories
vi
, Anjan Chakravartty identifies two processes involved in this construction: 
abstraction and idealization (Chakravartty 2007, 190).  According to Chakravartty, abstraction 
involves ignoring some of the often numerous factors present in a physical system in order to 
construct a model that will serve as a simplification of this physical system (Chakravartty 
2007, 190).  The simplified model only represents some of the factors that are potentially (or 
in fact) relevant to the behavior of the physical system, usually for pragmatic reasons.  It is 
often the case that the number of factors relevant to the behavior of the physical system being 
studied is too many to be included in a model of that physical system.  Moreover, the relative 
significance of these ignored factors is negligible in the particular context in which the 
physical system is being studied; the effects of these factors on the predictive accuracy of a 
theory may be miniscule at the relevant scale, for example.  Abstraction, however, “does not 
undermine the idea that putative representations of factors composing abstract models can be 
thought to have counterparts in the world.  The fact that some factors are ignored is perfectly 
consistent with the idea that others are represented” (Chakravartty 2007, 191).  The fact that 
certain factors are ignored when constructing a model of some physical system does not mean 
the relevant model cannot be an approximately accurate representation of the physical system. 
Idealization is also often employed when constructing scientific models.  Unlike mere 
abstraction, however, idealization involves more than simply excluding factors potentially 
relevant to the behavior of the physical system being studied: idealization also “[incorporates] 
factors that cannot exist as represented given the actual properties and relations involved” 
(Chakravartty 2007, 191).
vii
  In other words, idealization employs certain nomologically 
impossible assumptions in order to simplify the model being constructed (where this 
simplification can be motivated by the pragmatic constraints mentioned above). 
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As an example of abstraction and idealization in a scientific model, consider that of a 
simple pendulum (Chakravartty 2007, 191).  Such a model is usually presented as consisting 
of a weight attached to a pivot point by means of rod.  Factors such as the air resistance 
affecting the motion of the weight or the friction of the rotating pivot are usually excluded 
from the model, in accordance with the abstraction process.  Notice, however, that there is no 
principled reason why such a model that ignores these factors could not be physically 
realized.  A closed physical system containing no air resistance and no friction is 
nomologically possible: i.e., it could be physically realized without violating the actual laws 
of nature. 
Other elements of the model are simplified beyond what is physically realizable in any 
such system, however.  Examples are the rod’s total lack of mass in the model, as well as the 
representation of the weight as a point-mass: an object whose total mass is concentrated at a 
single extension-less point.  These types of simplifications (idealizations) could not in 
principle be physically realized by any system: a rod pivoting around a point with a weight 
attached must have some non-zero mass in any physical system; likewise, the mass of this 
weight could not be completely condensed down to a single dimensionless point in any 
physical system conforming to the actual laws of nature. 
Both abstraction and idealization are often used simultaneously in scientific practice for 
the construction of models (Chakravartty 2007, 191).  Nevertheless, the distinction 
concerning nomological possibility mentioned above will prove to have significant 
implications for the epistemic attitudes of the Structural Realist towards the formal structures 
of scientific theories. 
 
VI. Limiting Cases as Idealizations 
Recall the notion of structural continuity that is at the heart of the Epistemic Structural 
Realist’s version of the “No Miracles” Argument.  The Epistemic Structural Realist will argue 
that there is substantial (even if incomplete) structural continuity between successive mature 
scientific theories, which means the formal structures of earlier theories will be viewed as 
approximately accurate from the point of view of later (mature) theories.  This claim of 
approximate structural accuracy, in turn, will be the only acceptable explanation of the 
empirical success enjoyed by each of the successive theories and so should be accepted. 
Again, the notion of incomplete preservation of structure between successive theories is 
understood in terms of limiting cases.  Consider the successive theories of classical 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, for example.
viii
  Both theories seem to meet the 
criterion of maturity (in Worrall’s sense), since both have enjoyed novel predictive success.  
Moreover, the two theories exemplify the limiting case relation with which the Epistemic 
Structural Realist explains partial structural continuity.  The formal structure of 
thermodynamics can be derived from the formal structure of statistical mechanics by taking 
the “thermodynamic limit” in the latter: assuming the relevant physical system contains an 
infinite number of particles (Batterman 2005, 227).  By allowing the number of particles in 
the system to tend to infinity, the formal structure of thermodynamics can be recovered from 
the formal structure of statistical mechanics.   
Notice, however, that this “thermodynamic limit” is an idealization: no system with an 
infinite number of particles could be physically realized
ix
.  It follows that the limiting case 
relation between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics can only be instantiated by 
making use of an idealization (viz., the “thermodynamic limit” assumption).  But this means 
that the formal structure of the theory of thermodynamics can only be recovered from the 
formal structure of statistical mechanics through the use of an assumption that is not merely 
(strictly) false, but physically impossible.  In other words, the partial retention of formal 
structure between these two mature theories in terms of the limiting case relation employs a 
nomologically impossible assumption. 
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VII. Problems with Employing Idealizations 
This use of idealization in the derivation of limiting cases can be found among many 
other mature successive scientific theories.
x
  It poses a problem, however, for the Epistemic 
Structural Realist’s claim about the approximate structural accuracy of scientific theories.  
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is partial structural continuity between two 
mature successive theories such as thermodynamics and statistical mechanics.  The presence 
of this partial structural continuity will imply that the two theories exemplify the limiting case 
relation, since the partial structural continuity is understood in terms of this limiting case 
relation for the Epistemic Structural Realist.  So thermodynamics will constitute a limiting 
case of statistical mechanics.  This, in turn, means that the derivation of the thermodynamic 
formal structure from the statistical mechanical formal structure will involve an idealization.  
The theory of thermodynamics will thus constitute an idealization of the relevant physical 
system by virtue of the role the “thermodynamic limit” (discussed above) plays in deriving 
the formal structure of thermodynamics from the formal structure of statistical mechanics.  
But if this is the case, then the formal structure of thermodynamics will be rendered not just 
inaccurate, strictly speaking; it will constitute a nomologically impossible structure, by virtue 
of the use of the “thermodynamic limit” idealization.  Given that the structure of 
thermodynamics cannot be physically realized, then, in what sense can it be said to be an 
approximately accurate representation of the physical structure of the world?  To what degree 
could a nomologically impossible structure approximate a (the) nomological structure that 
actually obtains? 
Notice that the Epistemic Structural Realist cannot fall back on an appeal to approximate, 
as opposed to strict, accuracy of structure here (as was done in response to Pincock’s 
objection above).  The problem for the Epistemic Structural Realist is not just that the formal 
structure of the thermodynamic theory is strictly false, and therefore disconnected from reality 
to some extent.
xi
  The problem is deeper than this: the formal structure of thermodynamics 
could not possibly be realized by the structure of the physical system that actually obtains in 
our world.  The notion of its approximate accuracy in representing the physical structure of 
the world is thus rendered a complete mystery.  As a result, the Epistemic Structural Realist is 
left without a reason to believe in the approximate structural accuracy of thermodynamics. 
The nomological impossibility of the thermodynamic theory’s formal structure thus 
undermines the motivation for believing in its approximate truth.  But if belief in the 
approximate accuracy of the thermodynamic structure can no longer be justified, then the 
Epistemic Structural Realist is left without an explanation for the empirical success of 
science.  Without a reason to believe in the approximate accuracy of the thermodynamic 
formal structure, the structural continuity obtaining between thermodynamics and statistical 
mechanics is no longer enough to mount a structural version of the “No Miracles” argument.  
This appears to undermine the entire Epistemic Structural Realist position. 
 
VIII. Potential ESR Reponses and Replies 
 
(1) Appeal to Empirical Success 
At this point, the Epistemic Structural Realist might appeal to the empirical success of 
thermodynamics in order to argue that the use of idealization assumptions does not undermine 
the reasons for believing in the approximate structural accuracy of the theory.  Of course, the 
mere empirical success of thermodynamics is not enough to ground the realism of the 
Epistemic Structural Realist: the latter must give an explanation of this empirical success. 
The problem, it seems, is that this explanation will have to take the form of another “No 
Miracles” argument: the reason thermodynamics proved so empirically successful is the fact 
that its formal structure is an approximately accurate representation of the physical structure 
108                                                                         The Problem of Nomological Impossibility  
 
 
The Hilltop Review, Spring 2015 
in the world (Worrall 2007, 143).  But it is precisely the approximate structural accuracy of 
the theory that is being questioned.  So an appeal to empirical success will either not be 
enough by itself (since this will not be enough to grant the Epistemic Structural Realist a 
“Realist” status), or will presuppose the approximate structural accuracy of the theory that is 
at issue. 
Other types of explanation seem to be off-limits to the Epistemic Structural Realist 
precisely because of the epistemic commitment to structures only.  Worrall (2007) notes that 
the way in which the formal structure of a theory can successfully represent the physical 
structure of the world “cannot be further specified—to suppose that it can would be to 
suppose that we can somehow have access to the universe that is not theory-mediated and thus 
can directly compare what our theories say with reality”, this last claim being “untenable” 
(Worrall 2007, 143).  In other words, any explanation that purported to specify exactly how 
the formal structure of a theory manages to successfully represent the physical structure of the 
world would have to go beyond an epistemic commitment to mere structures
xii
.  But this 
would be to go beyond the Epistemic Structural Realist position itself. 
 
(2) Appeal to Alternative Derivations 
The Epistemic Structural Realist might also respond by claiming that the above argument 
concerning structural continuity between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics does not 
generalize.  Even if the structural continuity between thermodynamics and statistical 
mechanics involves the use of an idealization, it does not follow that all instances of the 
limiting relation between mature successive theories will necessarily involve idealization 
assumptions.  It may be possible to derive the formal structure of an earlier theory from the 
formal structure of its successor without the need to invoke nomologically impossible limits.  
The formal structure of classical mechanics, for example, may be derived from the formal 
structure of relativistic mechanics by allowing the velocity of an object to approach zero 
instead of letting the speed of light tend toward infinity.  In this way, physically unrealizable 
assumptions may be avoided as consequences of partial structural continuity between 
successive theories. 
The mere possibility of derivations that do not rely on idealization assumptions is not 
enough, however.  In particular, the above alternative characterization of the limiting case 
relation that obtains between classical mechanics and relativistic mechanics does not clarify 
the structural continuity between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, or the sense in 
which the structure of the former can be said to be approximately accurate.  The successful 
avoidance of idealization assumptions in a single case of theory succession, in other words, 
does not resolve the mystery of how the formal structure of an earlier theory can be an 
idealization of its successor, and yet count as approximately accurate, in many other cases of 
paradigm structural continuity between successive mature scientific theories.  Similar 
alternative derivations of structure that avoided the use of idealizations
xiii
 would have to be 
provided for other paradigm cases of structural continuity between successive theories.  Until 
then, cases such as the transition from thermodynamics to statistical mechanics remain 
problematic for the Epistemic Structural Realist’s claim to the approximate structural 
accuracy of predecessor theories. 
 
(3) Appeal to Approximation 
Finally, the Epistemic Structural Realist can appeal to a distinction between 
approximation and idealization (Frigg and Hartmann 2012, §1.1).  Though conceptually 
similar, approximation can be characterized as divorced from any concerns regarding 
nomological possibility.  When a mathematical equation is approximated by another equation 
by letting some quantity tend toward some limit, “the issue of physical interpretation need not 
arise. Unlike [idealization], which involves a distortion of a real system, approximation is a 
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purely formal matter” (Frigg and Hartmann 2012, §1.1).  In other words, the limiting case 
relation that obtains between the formal structure of thermodynamics (for example) and that 
of statistical mechanics can be a purely formal (mathematical) relation.  This would avoid the 
use of problematic idealization assumptions in the derivation of the thermodynamic structure 
from the statistical mechanical structure, while preserving some sense in which the former is a 
limiting case of the latter (and therefore preserving structural continuity between the two 
theories). 
But is this sense of “limiting case” robust enough for the Epistemic Structural Realist?  
Approximation, as described above, is an entirely formal relation obtaining between the 
structures of successive scientific theories.  It does not appeal to the relevant physical system 
(the system the two theories are presumably studying) in order to derive the formal structure 
of the earlier theory from the formal structure of the successor theory.  This, again, is in 
contrast to a derivation involving idealization assumptions.  But appeal to the relevant 
physical system seems necessary in securing the continuity of a structure that the Epistemic 
Structural Realist can have reason to believe (approximately) corresponds to the structure of 
the physical world.  Without appealing to the relevant physical system, the derivation of one 
formal structure from another reduces to what Newman (2005, 1378) calls “a trivial symbolic 
realism”.  The Epistemic Structural Realist no longer has reason to believe that the formal 
structure being preserved as a limiting case through the use of approximation is appropriately 
correlated with the physical system being studied.  Strictly formal relations between 
structures, after all, are not enough to show that both structures accurately represent (to an 
acceptably approximate degree) the physical relations obtaining within the relevant physical 
system.
xiv
  Even if the formal structure of statistical mechanics were an approximately 
accurate representation of a given physical system, the mere fact that the structure of 
thermodynamics was formally related to the structure of statistical mechanics would not 
guarantee that the formal structure of thermodynamics was also an approximately accurate 
representation of the physical system.
xv
  A more robust relation than mere approximation is 
needed in order to secure the structural accuracy of thermodynamics from the fact that there is 
structural continuity between the two theories of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. 
 
IX. Additional Implications of Employing Idealizations 
The use of idealization assumptions in establishing a limiting case relation between 
successive theories undermines the Epistemic Structural Realist’s reasons for believing in the 
approximate structural accuracy of the earlier theory.  This result, however, poses potential 
problems for belief in the approximate structural accuracy of successor theories as well. 
One possible difficulty for the Epistemic Structural Realist is the inability to justify belief 
in the structural accuracy of the successor theory, given that belief in the structural accuracy 
of the earlier theory is no longer tenable.  The use of idealization assumptions in the 
derivation of the earlier theory’s structure from the successor theory’s structure casts doubt on 
even the approximate structural accuracy of the earlier theory, since these idealization 
assumptions imply that the structure of the earlier theory could never be physically realized.  
But if belief in the approximate structural accuracy of the earlier theory is thus undermined, 
what reason does the Epistemic Structural Realist have left to believe in the approximate 
structural accuracy of the successor theory?  A significant motivation for establishing 
structural continuity between successor theories, after all, is to provide justification for the 
belief in accumulation of true structural content: justification for the belief that the refinement 
of structure leads to an increasingly accurate representation of the physical structure of the 
world.  If there is reason to doubt the approximate structural accuracy of an earlier theory, 
however, then structural continuity will not provide justification for the belief in the 
approximate structural accuracy of the successor theory.  The earlier theory cannot bequeath 
approximate structural accuracy to any successor theories if it does not have this approximate 
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structural accuracy in the first place.  Consequently, the justification of the Epistemic 
Structural Realist for the belief in the structural accuracy of successor theories is also 
undermined. 
A second possible worry is a version of the Pessimistic Meta-Induction, in terms of 
idealization.  If the structure of thermodynamics is a physically unrealizable idealization of 
the structure of statistical mechanics, how can the Epistemic Structural Realist be sure that the 
structure of statistical mechanics will not itself be an idealization of some future theory’s 
structure?  Epistemic Structural Realism, after all, was proposed as a philosophical theory that 
respected the occurrence of theory-change in the sciences, and took seriously the likely 
possibility that even current scientific theories will (likely) one day be superseded.  But if the 
theory of statistical mechanics, for example, may one day be shown to be simply a limiting 
case of some future theory, then all of the reasons for doubting the approximate structural 
accuracy of thermodynamics pose a risk to the Epistemic Structural Realist’s confidence in 
the structural accuracy of statistical mechanics as well.  Even if there are reasons independent 
of structural continuity and the empirical success of science for believing that the structure of 
some future theory accurately represents (to some degree) the structure of the physical world 
(what would these reasons be?), this does not preclude the possibility that statistical 
mechanics itself, the currently more mature scientific theory available (as compared with 
thermodynamics), will be shown to have a physically unrealizable structure.  Consequently, 
the Epistemic Structural Realist is left without reason to believe in the approximate structural 
accuracy of any mature scientific theories, whether they have already been superseded or will 
one day be supplanted. 
 
X. Conclusion 
Epistemic Structural Realism claims there is preservation of formal structure through the 
succession of one scientific theory by another.  It appeals to this structural continuity in order 
to formulate an argument for the structures in mature theories being approximately accurate 
representations of the physical structure of the world.  The concept of structural continuity is 
understood in terms of a limiting case relation obtaining between successive theories.  This 
limiting case relation, in turn, is often established using idealization assumptions: the structure 
of a theory is a limiting case of the structure of its successor theory when the earlier structure 
can be derived (recovered) from the successor structure, given certain initial and boundary 
conditions. 
It is often the case, however, that these initial and boundary conditions are idealizations 
of the physical system being studied by both theories.  The derivation of an earlier structure 
from its successor, therefore, employs nomologically impossible assumptions.  This suggests 
the earlier structure is itself physically unrealizable, which undermines the claim that it is an 
approximately true representation of the structure governing the physical system being 
studied.  But if the earlier structure can no longer be considered approximately accurate, this 
undermines whatever claim to approximate truth the successor structure enjoys: the successor 
structure cannot inherit any approximate accuracy from the earlier structure if this earlier 
structure has none to bequeath in the first place, after all.  This suggests Epistemic Structural 
Realism as a whole is undermined, which in turn threatens the justification for a belief in the 
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i
 Worrall defines “mature” scientific theories as those theories that lead to novel empirical 
generalizations beyond any empirical consequences that have already been observed.  
These generalizations must be shown to generate new and empirically successful 
predictions (Worrall 1989, 113-114). 
ii
 Worrall associates the formal structure of a scientific theory with the mathematical 
equations describing the behavior of theoretical entities in a physical system (Worrall 
1989, 118-119). 
iii
 By way of an example, Pincock writes: “We could imagine a competing electromagnetic 
theory which ascribed two kinds of charge to particles and had complicated equations 
relating these different kinds of charges to each other and to the trajectories of the 
relevant particles” (Pincock 2011, 74). 
iv
 Another example: “Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory ignored these possibilities [of 
electromagnetic interactions being affected by intra-particle forces at high energy levels] 
and so this parameter [representing the relevant intra-particle forces] did not appear in 
that theory. Additional structure is needed to account for phenomena at higher energies, 
but we have no hint of this from the experiments conducted in Maxwell’s time” (Pincock 
2011, 74). 
v
 Cf. Worrall (2007, 142-144) for a discussion of partial structural retention. 
vi
 The Semantic View of theories claims scientific theories should be identified with 
collections of models, as opposed to being identified with a linguistic formal axiomatic 
system (as the Syntactic View suggests).  For further discussion, see Chakravartty (2007, 
187-190). 
vii
 Chakravartty’s distinction between abstraction and idealization roughly corresponds to the 
distinction between Aristotelian idealization and Galilean idealization.  See Frigg and 
Hartmann (2012, §1.1) for further discussion. 
viii
 Pincock (2011) discusses this example in relation to his objection described above 
(Pincock 2011, 77).  See also Batterman (2005), whom Pincock cites. 
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ix
 It is an interesting question whether or not the number of particles in a physical system 
could continue to grow infinitely, without ever actually being infinite.  Regardless, the 
structure of such a system would not be a realization of the structure of thermodynamics, 
which would require an infinite number of particles according to statistical mechanics. 
x
 Famous examples include the conception of (1) Classical Mechanics as a limiting case of 
Relativistic Mechanics under the idealization of letting the speed of light tend to infinity 
in the formal structure of the latter, and (2) the Ideal Gas Law as a limiting case of certain 
thermodynamic equations under the idealization of having an ideal gas composed of point 
(dimensionless) particles.  Thanks to Marc Alspector-Kelly for bringing these examples 
to my attention. 
xi
 Cf. Mark Newman’s (2005) objection against the Epistemic Structural Realist, in which he 
argues that structural “retention through theory change is not sufficient” to establish the 
claim that a theory’s formal structure succeeds in accurately representing the physical 
structure of the world (Newman 2005, 1377). 
xii
 This is also the reason why the Epistemic Structural Realist cannot appeal to an ontological 
conception of formal structure in order to avoid the issues posed by the use of 
idealization assumptions.  Cf. Chakravartty (2007, 143-144) for a discussion of how an 
ontological conception of the Laws of Nature may avoid the “in-principle vacuity” of 
idealized formulations of these Laws. 
xiii
 It is not clear, however, that replacing a limit towards infinity with a limit towards zero will 
always succeed in avoiding idealization: it might also be nomologically impossible for 
certain quantities to tend towards zero in a physical system.  Recall, for example, the use 
of point-particles (whose dimensions tend toward zero), or the rod used in the simple 
pendulum model (whose mass tends towards zero). 
xiv
 This can be the case even when the use of purely formal methods to relate different 
structures proves empirically successful.  Cf. Johannes Kepler’s successful use of 
Platonic solids to model the distance relationships between the six planets known at the 
time (Di Liscia 2011, §3).  Thanks to Marc Alspector-Kelly for bringing this example to 
my attention. 
xv
 Cf. Pincock’s assertion concerning the considerations motivating preservation of structure: 
“If [purely] mathematical concerns are driving things, then there is little reason to believe 
the structural claims of the scientific theory” (Pincock 2011, 76). 
xvi
 I would like to thank Marc Alspector-Kelly, Matthew Minton Miller, and Dustin Van Pelt 
for a number of helpful discussions on the topics of this paper. 
